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Summary
This article traces the shifts in meaning of the metaphor of “natural law” in modern
thought from its pre-modern meaning as a divine standard for human behaviour
accessible to reason. Descartes expanded this meaning to include the regularity of
mechanical bodies by posing an absolute law system for all possible worlds as a
priori, rational, and axiomatic. Newton relativised this from the perspective of the
multi-facetted governance of God. The older conception of natural law sustained
itself in economics and politicology, serving as a defence of individual freedom and
non-intervention (Petty, Locke), but (dialectically) implying a determinism. It
remained linked to Cartesian meaning via attempts by Petty, Hobbes and Locke to
construct a natural science of social life.
Vroeë moderne opvattings van die “natuurwet”
Die artikel omlyn die verskuiwing in betekenis van die metafoor “natuurwet” in die
moderne denke, van sy voormoderne betekenis as ’n goddelike maatstaf vir menslike
gedrag toeganklik vir die rede. Descartes het hierdie betekenis uitgebrei om die
reëlmaat van meganiese liggame in te sluit, deur ’n absolute wetsisteem vir alle
moontlike wêrelde as a priori, rasioneel, aksiomaties te poneer. Newton het laasge-
noemde gerelativeer uit ’n perspektief op die veelfasettige regering van God. Die
ouer opvatting van “natuurwet” is gehandhaaf in die ekonomie en die politikologie,
waar dit gedien het as verdediging van individuele vryheid en non-intervensie
(Petty, Locke), maar ook (dialekties) ’n determinisme geïmpliseer het. Dit het egter
verband bly hou met die Cartesiese betekenis deur pogings van Petty, Hobbes en
Locke om ’n natuurwetenskap van die sosiale lewe te konstrueer.
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Some postmodernists support a Heideggerian view of “modernity”as a humanism according to which humankind rightfully trans-forms nature according to its own image and plans (cf Heidegger
1952: 81ff). Craig Owens (1987: 65) uses the terminology of Lyotard
to express this:
Master narrative — how else to translate Lyotard’s grand récit? And in
this translation we glimpse the terms of another analysis of moderni-
ty’s demise, one that speaks not of the incompatibility of the various
modern narratives, but instead of their fundamental solidarity. For
what made the grands récits of modernity master narratives if not the
fact that they were all narratives of mastery, man seeking his telos in
the conquest of nature? What function did these narratives play other
than to legitimise Western man’s self-appointed mission of transfor-
ming the entire planet in his own image? And what form did this
mission take if not that of man’s placing of his stamp on everything
that exists — that is, the transformation of the world into a represen-
tation, with man as its subject?
Owens understands modernity’s view of the relationship between
“man” and “nature” as a universal narrative of mastery. Faced with such
a general statement, the question arises whether modernity really pre-
sents us with a monolith of narratives of mastery.
1. The issue
One way to test this understanding of the modern era is to follow the
development of the metaphor of “natural law”, which played a crucial
role in the way in which the relationship between humankind, “na-
ture”, and God was understood. Such a study — limited here to early
modern conceptions of natural law — gives a much more nuanced pic-
ture. One can for example sustain Owens’s interpretation of modernity
with regard to thinkers like Descartes and Hobbes (as well as later mo-
dern thinkers like Quesnay, Kant, Comte and Marx) but it is much
more difficult to argue a case for Boyle, Newton, and Locke, who had
different views on the relationship between God, man, law and nature,
as well as a stronger sense of the relativity of human power.
Secondly, the concept of “nature” during this era is a problematic
one. The word may refer to “the state of nature” which was supposed
to have preceded the “civil state” or “culture”, as in Hobbes and
Locke (and later elaborated by Rousseau and Kant). In this context it
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usually refers to the dominance of the sentiments, passions, instincts,
senses, biological needs, the physical and the environment, in other
words the complex whole of the sub-rational (very often given mean-
ing in terms of a human-centred teleology) in contrast to the rati-
onal. But then each thinker had his own understanding of what the
“state of nature” actually entailed and how the sub-rational complex
functioned in that state (cf Venter 1999a: 4ff).
However, the combined term “natural law” (or “law of nature”)
may mean the age-old conception of a cosmic law reflected in human
reason, and normative for human behaviour in the natural sphere (as
opposed to the supernatural since the Middle Ages). One finds this in
Calvin and Bodin, in early capitalist economic theory (Petty), and in
Locke. But Petty and Locke shifted the conception of rational natural
law in the direction of a basis for freedom (rather than the medieval
idea of a basis for intervention by the church and the state). Since
Descartes, however, “natural law” has also indicated (an axiom about)
the regularities of spatially extended mechanical bodies (which in the
context of the mechanistic worldview also include the biotic aspect of
such bodies). Boyle and Newton disregarded the character of pure in-
nate rationality which Descartes ascribed to these laws. Nor did they
simply accept the Cartesian belief in the lordship of man over the
world by virtue of knowledge of these laws.
My first intention is to trace in this article the development of the
conception of “natural law” or the “law of nature” in early modern
times, showing the divergence of meaning between (i) the rational
law for human behaviour and (ii) the axiom valid for mechanical pro-
cesses, as well as (iii) the shifts within these two meanings.1
The “law” metaphor, however, did not stand on its own. It was
connected in a primary (“efficient”) sense with a lawgiver, and in a
teleological (“final”) sense with a “for whom” (the primary and the
final senses are usually, but not necessarily the same). Ontologically
the conception of the lawgiver and the telos makes a difference both
in the understanding of what a law of nature is and in the apprecia-
1 One may add that the two meanings coalesced again in the eighteenth century
in Quesnay (with the subrational reference as dominant in the hierarchy); in the
nineteenth century, Comte’s “law” and “natural law” became indistinguishable.
tion of the importance of natural law. Thus we find a relativising of
law in a voluntarist conception of the divine (as in Calvin, Boyle, and
Newton), and an absolutisation of law in a non-voluntarist idea of
God, as in Descartes (as well as Comte and Einstein in later moder-
nity). The idea of “natural law” ought therefore not to be treated as
independent, but rather in the context of ontological conceptions.
Secondly, I wish to provide a sketch of the formation of the con-
ception of “natural law”, in the hope that it will contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of its meanings and shifts. In this regard a testing
of the Mason-Zilsel hypothesis about the origin of the term “law of
nature” may provide a direction. Mason  (1956: 135-7) and Zilsel
(1942) searched for the origins of this term (referring to those laws
studied in the natural sciences):
• in an analogy of the practice of civil government by statutory law
introduced by the absolute monarchs of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, and
• in the Judaeo-Christian conception of God as the absolute mo-
narch which, according to them, was derived from the despotisms
of Babylon. This latter concept is supposed to have been intro-
duced into Western thought via the Stoics (who frequently used
the term “laws of nature”, strongly influenced by the Babyloni-
ans), who flourished as a school during the despotic phases of
Greek and Roman history. Indeed, the idea of a cosmic order was
widespread among the nations of the ancient world (the Near
East, Egypt, and Greece; cf Wolters 1994: 43-6). But the Israel-
ites may have been too easily included among those who believed
in a despotic god, since their belief in a divine world order ante-
dates their monarchy. Their idea of God includes a loving father-
hood rather than a mere despot, and it is in the Bible that one
finds a democratisation of the ancient idea that the king is the
image of God, when every human being is said to have been
created in the image of God (cf Bartholomew 1994: 66).
Mason believes that the term “laws of nature” was not often used
in the Middle Ages, and was revived when the idea of civil govern-
ment by an absolute monarch through statutory law was introduced
by the Frenchman Jean Bodin, and implemented in France. Mason
and Zilsel consider it no accident that some forty years after Bodin’s
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theory of sovereignty another Frenchman, Descartes, characterised
God as the “legislator of the universe”. Mason (1956: 137) adds that
some forty years before Bodin, yet another Frenchman, Jean Calvin,
was working towards the conception of God as the absolute ruler of
the universe, governing by laws decided upon from the beginning. It
was the Calvinists, he says, rather than the Catholics, who spread as-
pects of Cartesian philosophy while the latter defended Aristotle
against Descartes.
Mason probably sensed the absolutising of law in Descartes. Ac-
cording to Descartes, God could not have approached creation other-
wise than through the specific laws.2 Descartes thus went in search
of an absolutist view of law and the lawgiver, which he believed
could be found in Calvin and Bodin. He was probably correct as far
as Bodin is concerned, but Calvin’s views were more nuanced, and
neither Boyle nor Newton followed in Descartes’s footsteps in this
specific regard.
Mason adds that the idea of quantitative laws of nature may have
come from the conception of law found among the merchant societies
such as the lex mercatoria (1622) of Gerard Malynes:
True law is a right reason of nature, agreeing therewith in all points,
diffused and spread in all nations, consisting perpetually, whereby
meum and tuum are distinguished and distributed by number,
weight, and measure (quoted in Mason 1956: 136).
It ought to be pointed out that here — in a document which appear-
ed during the lifetime of Descartes — “right reason of nature” refers
to economic activities and objects; in other words the expression is
not limited in meaning to non-human or non-voluntary processes.
Malynes is saying that “true law” agrees with nature and is universal,
and that such laws determine property relations by quantification.
This is the continuation of a tradition about property that may be
traced back to ancient Egypt, and its understanding of nature reflects
the Stoic tradition. The shift towards a conception of nature and
natural law which modelled human processes on physical ones, initi-
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2 Comte would later follow in Descartes’s footsteps by subjecting his divinity
(humanity) to the universal laws, and Einstein would much later repeat Des-
cartes’s view of the relationship between the law and God.
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ated in the mechanistic approach of Descartes, occurred over a period
and is probably not yet to be found in Malynes.
I shall attempt to highlight part of the history of the understand-
ing of “natural law” by giving an overview of the shifts in the early
modern uses of the term. But for the sake of a broader background,
which may assist in giving a clearer outline of the shift, it may be
helpful to test the Zilsel-Mason approach more intensively, and also
to include some pre-modern conceptions in the study. It is hoped
that such an analysis will bring the diversity of meanings of “natural
law” and the interaction among these meanings to the fore, and lead
to a more flexible understanding of the relationship between man
and nature in modernity than that of Owens (quoted above).
2. Ancient and medieval ideas of natural law
The inclusion of humanity in the context of “natural law” is in accor-
dance with a long tradition coming from the Stoics. Willey (1961:
14ff) points out that the Stoic idea of “natural law” (as an inner law
of duty which expresses the external universal order) was fused with
the ius gentium of the Roman jurists into a law of nature before which
all men are equal. Cicero (De legibus I, 7) validated the laws of the
state against this original source of law. As early as Gaius the ius gen-
tium is defined as the “right constituted by natural reason”.
A fusion of this tradition with biblical faith was brought about by
Christianity, which played on two “states of nature” — nature before
and after the fall. Thus Ambrose of Milan viewed property not as an
institution of nature but of the post-lapsarian greed of usurpation;
nature gave all things to all men in common. All men are also by na-
ture free, but sin made serfdom and coercion natural. The rule of the
Gospel that we should do unto others as we want done to us, says
Willey (1961: 16), was considered a law of nature, but sinful man has
to be coerced by positive law to obey this natural law.
All through the Middle Ages natural law was used as the basis of
criticism of the established order, for natural law was seen as the ra-
tional expression of God’s law, and this did in some cases lead to cri-
ticism of the treatment of poverty and the institution of slavery.
Thomas Aquinas identified the law of nature with the imprint of
the eternal law in human reason, where it serves as a principle for
practical reason (Summa Theologica XCI, 2-3; 1945: 742ff). Thus lex
naturalis refers specifically to human rational insights for practical
life, while in other creatures the eternal law of God is expressed in
their forms (which, as in Aristotle, are conceived of in teleological
terms). Thomas thus contextualised natural law in terms of a hierar-
chical order in which the Ambrosian views could scarcely be sustain-
ed and domination by the established order became normative. Na-
tural law thus provided a rationalisation for intervention by state and
church in areas of life which are not the direct concern of these insti-
tutions, such as economic activity. Given the stature of Thomas A-
quinas, this alone speaks against Mason’s neglect of the Middle Ages.
Calvin and Bodin continued the idea of rational law as divine law,
which forms the basis of critique of human positive law and human
actions, but Calvin did not show as much trust in the ability of hu-
man reason and earthly powers — even the church — to interpret di-
vine law as the Middle Ages and Bodin had. Early capitalism, in the
sixteenth and especially the seventeenth century, would continue the
application of natural law to human activities, but use it as a defence
of the notion that free economic activity follows its own laws, and
therefore in support of non-intervention.
3. Calvin and Bodin
How sustainable is the Zilsel-Mason thesis that Calvin and Bodin are
sources of the modern (Cartesian) concept of a rational law of nature
which refers to the subrational (specifically the mechanical) and is
based upon the metaphor of a despotic God?
3.1 Jean Calvin (1509-1564)
Some interpreters of Calvin provide support for the thesis that the
basic principle of his thought is indeed reducible to God as the cos-
mic lawgiver, for according to them Calvin proclaimed the “sove-
reignty of God” (cf for example Spykman 1976: 166-7; 195; Du
Plessis 1978: 321; 325; Van der Walt 1974: 393). It is true that the
theme of God’s law plays an important role in Calvin’s thought. In
7
Venter/Early modern conceptions of “natural law”
8
Acta Academica 2001: 33(2)
the 1536 edition of the Institutes of the Christian Religion, for example,
the analysis of the law of God forms part of the first issue of which
Calvin takes cognisance: the knowledge of God and ourselves. But
the context here is the question of understanding one’s own depen-
dence upon God’s grace and love (in contrast to the utter misery of
somebody outside that grace). What is absent, also, from the final
edition of the Institutes is the metaphor of “sovereignty”; neither is
this found in the very brief analysis of the state’s role towards the end
of the Institutes. It is important to note that Calvin uses different me-
taphors when he speaks about God in relation to creation, so that one
has to be careful not to reduce these simply to “law-giver” or “sove-
reign”. I cite the following passage in support of this reading:
[...] it undoubtedly follows that your life is sadly corrupted, if it is not
framed in obedience to him, since his will ought to be the law of our
lives. On the other hand, your idea of his nature is not clear unless you
acknowledge him to be the origin and fountain of all goodness. [...]
For, first of all, the pious mind does not devise for itself any kind of
God, but looks alone to the true God [...] He by whom God is thus
known, perceiving how he governs all things, confides in him as his
guardian and protector, and casts himself entirely upon his faith-
fulness — perceiving him to be the source of every blessing, if he is
in any strait or feels any want, he instantly recurs to his protection and
trusts to his aid, — persuaded that he is good and merciful, he re-
clines upon him with sure confidence, and doubts not that, in the
divine clemency, a remedy will be provided for his every time of need
— acknowledging him as his Father and his Lord [...] Loving and re-
vering God as his father, honouring and obeying him as his master,
although there were no hell, he would revolt at the very idea of of-
fending him (Institutes of the Christian Religion I, ii, 3).
True, in this long quotation God does appear as a lawgiver with
authority, but He also appears as the source of life, as the one whose
will is law (after Occam this means God is personally involved), who
is the source of good and of all blessings, as governor of all, guardian,
protector, the faithful one, the merciful, father, lord, with majesty,
glory, and judge. Calvin did not systematise these metaphorical attri-
butes, and interpreters ought to be careful not too easily to subsume
them all under the heading of “sovereignty” or “law-giver”. When it
comes to governing the world, Calvin expressly rejects the mechanis-
tic deism which reduces the involvement of God to giving an im-
pulse to a machine which then runs on that energy. God’s providence
“consists in action” (Institutes I, xvi, 4) and the world is not governed
simply via God’s power, but by his decree.3 Calvin makes a special
point of indicating that even when it appears as if matters proceed by
themselves on a fixed course (such as the seasons), God — by paternal
favour or judgement — is still personally involved. God, by active
involvement, steers everything to its proper end. A teleological prin-
ciple is therefore involved, but it differs from that of Aristotle in the
sense that God is here not the far-off magnetic final cause who un-
knowingly pulls everything towards its form. God is a governor, yes,
but in his government he remains the loving father.
As we have noted above, Calvin rejects the idea of law associated
with the regularities of a mechanical automaton. His idea of law is
much wider. He accepts a “natural law” imprinted on the heart of hu-
mankind — the original order of creation aimed at the wellbeing of
humankind — but notes that humankind is so immersed in the
darkness of error that it is scarcely able to form a tolerable idea of the
worship of God (Calvin 1979: Institutes II, viii, 1-2). God therefore
has given humankind his law in written form. Calvin uses “law” in a
twofold sense, as he finds it in the Bible: “the whole doctrine of
Moses” related to his “universal office” to preach both repentance and
faith, but also the part pertaining to Moses’ specific ministry as
expressed in precepts, rewards and punishments. Law and gospel are
substantially the same — they only differ in the form of
administration (cf Bandstra 1976: 15; 21ff).
God is active in his law in both senses. By his ordo naturae (the
objective basis of the lex naturae in the human heart), God sustains
his creation, and by his law as the particular rule of grace he reveals
9
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3 “My intention now is, to refute an opinion which has very generally obtained
— an opinion which, while it concedes to God some blind and equivocal move-
ment, withholds what is of principal moment — viz the disposing and direct-
ing of everything to its proper end by incomprehensible wisdom. By withhold-
ing government, it makes God the ruler of the world in name only, not in rea-
lity. For what, I ask, is meant by government, if it is not to preside so as to regu-
late the destiny of that over which you preside? I do not, however, totally repu-
diate what is said of an universal providence, provided, on the other hand, it is
conceded to me that the world is governed by God, not only because he main-
tains the order of nature appointed by him, but because he takes a special
charge of every one of his works” (Calvin 1979: Institutes I, xvi, 4).
what is necessary for their salvation. God is, however, not subject to
his law: Deus legibus solutus est (Calvin adapts the principle from Ro-
man law: princeps legibus solutus est). But God is not exlex — not the
arbitrary God of Occam, but faithfully involved in the execution of
his law. Or, as Calvin says commenting on Exodus 3: 22, God’s power
is above all law, yet his will and actions are in fact justice; his actions
are elevated above the law and yet they are in themselves the whole
law (cf Du Plessis 1978: 326-7).
Although Calvin, in his very cursory analysis of the power of the
earthly authority, demanded obedience from the citizen (and did not
clearly opt for an ideal form of government), he also charged the earth-
ly authorities under the law of God with a special task, to protect
those under their authority and to execute justice with equity. He al-
lowed the “magistrates” to resist and replace the government of the
day if it deviated from justice and equity (cf Calvin 1979: Institutes IV,
xx; Du Plessis 1978: 343ff). His follower, Johannes Althusius (1557-
1638), concluded from this that controls are required in the form of
ombudsman-like officers who monitor the functioning of government
and resist deviations from justice and equity (cf Wolf 1963: 177ff).
Calvin’s idea of law — both its encompassing content and the re-
lationships in which it stands to God and creatures — and the variety
of ways in which he speaks of God make it difficult to fit him into the
history of the concept of natural law in the simple manner adopted by
Mason. There are some kinships between Calvin’s idea of God’s
governance and that of Newton (as indicated below), but it is
probably easier to support Mason and Zilsel’s hypothesis that Bodin’s
doctrine of sovereignty may have been a precursor of Descartes’s un-
derstanding of natural law, and that the latter may have been the be-
ginning of a large portion of the modern understanding of natural law.
3.2 Jean Bodin (1529/30-1596)
Like Calvin, his younger contemporary Bodin had a Catholic ecclesi-
astical training with strong Renaissance influences, and opposed the
Aristotelian tradition, but whereas the early Calvin was more interes-
ted in the Stoics, Bodin seems have gone the way of Platonism. Bodin
(in his Six books of the commonwealth, of 1576) focused his attention on
the commonwealth as the rightly ordered government of a number of
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families and their common concern by a sovereign power (Bodin [sa]:
1). According to Bodin the conditions of felicity are the same for the
commonwealth and the individual, and lie in the intellective and
contemplative virtues (Bodin [sa]: 2-3) — as Plato and Aristotle also
believed. It is the sovereign power who determines the felicity of the
commonwealth, and therefore also of the individual citizen. Bodin’s
idea of the state is not only totalitarian, but also (and this may have
been the basis for the metaphor of a divine lawgiver) monarchical in
the strongest sense of the word: the prince is the sovereign in an ab-
solute sense and rules by command.4 The attributes of his sovereign-
ty — the sole rights of the prince — include the right to declare war
and make peace, to authorise appointments to public office, and to
be the source of all rights of jurisdiction, regardless of the customary
ways of executing these functions (Bodin [sa]: 40ff). Bodin does,
however, relativise the power of the monarch by subjecting it to di-
vine and natural law.5 He consistently distinguishes between “di-
vine” and “natural” law; it is not clear exactly how the two relate to
one another.
But as in Cicero, so in Bodin, there is a higher law (or laws) than
that of the earthly sovereign. Unlike Althusius, however, Bodin did
not provide for control mechanisms to oversee the government of the
4 “On the other hand it is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he
cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who
makes the law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete
law. No one who is subject either to law or to some other person can do this.
That is why it is laid down in the civil law that the prince is above the law, for
the word law in Latin implies the command of him who is invested with
sovereign power. [...] If the prince is not bound by the laws of his predecessors,
still less can he be bound by his own laws. One may be subject to laws made by
another, but it is impossible to bind oneself to any matter” (Bodin [sa]: 28).
5 “It is far otherwise with divine and natural laws. All the princes of the earth are
subject to them, and cannot contravene them without treason or rebellion
against God. His yoke is upon them, and they must bow their heads in fear and
reverence before his divine majesty. The absolute power of princes and sove-
reign lords does not extend to the laws of God and of nature. He who best un-
derstood the meaning of absolute power, and made kings and emperors submit
to his will, defined his sovereignty as a power to override positive law; he did
not claim power to set aside divine and natural law” (Bodin [sa]: 29).
prince — in his view, the French Estates were purely consultative in
his view. Given Bodin’s rather precise concept of law as the command
of the sovereign, and the absolute sovereignty ascribed to the prince,
one could with more ease derive from this the metaphor of a law of
nature in the sub-human sense. (It is also possible that the source of
the interpretation of Calvin in terms of the metaphor of the “sove-
reignty of God” may have been an overestimation of the similarities
between Calvin and Bodin).
It must also be stated that “natural law”, both in Calvin and in
Bodin, still had the sense of a law aimed at human life known by the
human cognitive function (usually “reason”). It would take a special
— modern (?) — suggestion that the idea of nature can be reduced
to the non-human or the non-voluntary or the animal (which inclu-
des the sub-rational functions of the human being): a suggestion that
may be derived from the mechanistic approach of Descartes. The
bridge between the rational and the sub-rational can possibly be
found in the idea of law as innate rational axiom, in Descartes.
4. Descartes — the innate laws of nature
René Descartes (1596-1650), sometimes called the father of Modern
philosophy, is known for the approach of methodical doubt, and for
his rationalism. Metaphysically Descartes still supposed that every
phenomenon and change has a cause, of which the first cause (which
is also the ultimate rational ground) is the “self-caused” substance
(Descartes 1969: I, li; cf Clay 1915: 92). But “substance” is used here
analogically, since there is no common signification of the word be-
tween God and creatures. However, the word is used univocally for
the two kinds of earthly substances (mind and body) for, like the self-
caused substance, they exist independently (attributes depend on
them) although they cannot exist without the self-caused substance
as their cause. Each has a distinct attribute — the mind has thinking
and the body has extension (Descartes 1969: I, lii-liii).
It is well-known that Descartes belonged to the deductivist tra-
dition: he wanted to construct the whole corpus of knowledge after
the pattern of geometry on the basis of a few axioms, which them-
selves have their roots in “clear and distinct” notions, believing, as he
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says in Part 2 of the Discourse of method (Descartes 1969: 17), that all
things knowable to man are connected in the same way as geometri-
cal deduction, and in this way not much can be hidden from reason.
We have clear and distinct notions of the thinking substance, the cor-
poreal substance, and of God, as well as of duration, order, and num-
ber (Descartes 1969: I, liv-lv).
Descartes also retains his deductivist approach in natural science,
where laws are reflected in the mind as axioms from which we can
derive all important truths:
[...] but I have also observed certain laws established in nature by
God in such a manner, and of which he has impressed on our minds
such notions, that after we have reflected sufficiently upon these, we
cannot doubt that they are accurately observed in all that exists or
takes place in the world: and, farther, by considering the concatena-
tion of these laws, it appears to me that I have discovered many
truths more useful and more important than all I had before lear-
ned, or even expected to learn (Descartes 1969: V, 33).
God is both the cause and the reason behind the law. Nothing in
any category of causation, Descartes says, can exist which does not de-
pend upon God — hence we must assume that eternal truths do not
depend upon any creaturely thing but “on God alone, who, as the su-
preme legislator, ordained them from all eternity” (Descartes 1969:
VI, 8). Since there are only two substances, mind (thinking) and body
(extension), one has to expect that all non-thinking aspects of reality
will be reduced to extension, of which movement is a part. This whole
area of natural phenomena (including the previously organically con-
ceived stars) functions according to mechanical principles, and the
living organism (including the human body) is nothing but a mecha-
nical aggregate with movement and extension (Clay 1915: 94). Des-
cartes — anticipating Newton’s law of inertia to a certain degree —
formulates the axioms (laws) of corporeal nature:
God is the First Cause of movement and [...] He always preserves an
equal amount of movement in the universe. The first law of nature:
that each thing as far as it is capable, continues always in the same
state; and that which is once moved always continues so to move
[...]
The second law of nature: that all motion is of itself in a straight
line; and thus things which move in a circle always tend to recede
from the centre of the circle that they describe [...]
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The third law: that a body that comes into contact with another
stronger than itself, loses nothing of its movement; if it meets one
less strong, it loses as much as it passes over to that body [...]
(Descartes 1969: II, xxxvi-xl).
Descartes is looking for regularity — the law for him is a relation-
ship set by God, from which we can easily deduce the details. And
the above laws cover a wider area than simply the physical. He ex-
plains the first law by saying that if something is a square, it will re-
main a square unless there is intervention (cf Descartes 1969: II,
xxxvii). What causes these laws to be what they are is the immutabi-
lity of God (Clay 1915: 95).
It is important to note that the deductivist approach, in combi-
nation with the wide extension ascribed to each law, necessitates ab-
stractionism in order to make the laws applicable to all non-thinking
phenomena. This renders the first law, in particular, almost meaning-
less — in contradistinction to Newton’s formulation, which limited
the law of inertia to the physical sphere, and could give it a much
more concrete meaning. A second consequence of this abstractio-
nism, noted by Descartes himself, is that “the principles are so simple
and general” and “the power of nature is so ample and vast” that
every single effect can be deduced in many different ways from the
principles. To determine the correct way requires a further search by
dint of experiment, which in turn can be explained in different ways.
Taking into account Descartes’s intention of deducing effects from
first causes which find their single unity in God, and limiting the
deduction to the basis of “certain germs of truths naturally existing
in our minds”, this was in fact a major failure of his mathematical
method, although Descartes believed that he could explain all objects
of sense by his principles (Descartes 1969: VI, 51; cf Clay 1915: 96).
It is also important to say something about the functioning of
these natural laws. In The discourse on method, part V, Descartes relates
his thought experiment about possible worlds. Starting from the
single principle of the perfection of God, he demonstrated (i) the
laws of nature as of such necessity that even if God created more
worlds, “there could have been none in which these laws were not ob-
served”, and (ii) how the matter in the original chaos had to arrange
itself to create a universe similar to the one we know. Thus God is
15
Venter/Early modern conceptions of “natural law”
somehow bound to the laws, which assume an absolute role, antici-
pating the absolutising of law in Auguste Comte or Albert Einstein
(Venter 1999b: 169ff). The laws assume an almost independent role,
such that Descartes can imagine an evolutionary process which verges
on the border of deism.6
Three important aspects of Descartes’s view of natural law have to
be noted. First, Descartes’s separation of thinking from extended bo-
dy and the formulation of laws governing the actions of corporeal
substances (the three laws quoted above being part of his analysis of
material things) suggests a reduction in the meaning of “nature” to
that of the non-thinking, and an alienation of the thinking subject
from non-thinking nature as an object. He uses a discourse in which
“nature”, “law in nature”, and “law of nature” are directly associated
with the material universe, and in this way contributes to a shift of
meaning away from the human sphere, for these expressions.
Secondly, Descartes defines a much more pointed meaning of “law”
of nature than Calvin, for example. In Descartes it represents the regu-
lar and necessary development of matter. But this metaphorical shift
still demands a correlate in God as the eternal “lawgiver”.
Thirdly, Descartes believes that knowledge of these laws can help
us obey another law which commands the promotion of the general
good of mankind, by coming to know the power of the elements and
the heavenly bodies to the same degree that we know the crafts of ar-
tisans, and “applying them in the same way to all the uses to which
we are adapted, and thus rendering ourselves lords and possessors of
6 “I was not, however, disposed from these circumstances to conclude that this world
had been created in the manner I described; for it is much more likely that God
made it at first such as it was to be. But this is certain [...] that the action by which
he now sustains it is the same with that by which he originally created it; so that
even although he had from the beginning given it no other form than that of chaos,
provided only he had established certain laws of nature, and had lent it his
concurrence to enable it to act as it is wont to do, it may be believed, without
discredit to the miracle of creation, that in this way alone, things purely material
might, in course of time, have become such as we observe them at present; and
their nature is much more easily conceived when they are beheld coming in this
manner gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as produced
at once in a finished and perfect state” (Descartes 1969: V, 36).
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nature” (Descartes 1969: VI, 49). In other words, the alienation of
the thinking subject from nature is also a relationship of overpower-
ing. The scientism of Descartes is the beginning of the elevation of
humankind above nature (note the words “lord” and “possessor”),
such that in Kant human reason itself appears as the “lawgiver”.
Descartes may therefore be seen as the starting point of what Owens
(1987) calls the narratives of mastery, but this notion did not imme-
diately take hold of every important thinker, for thinkers like Boyle
and Newton relativise the range of what can be rationally known
about the laws of nature in Descartes’s sense.
5. The natural scientists: Boyle and Newton
5.1 Robert Boyle (1627-1691)
Boyle, a younger contemporary of Descartes, was an experimentalist
who would rather do with limited theory than without confirming
experiments. In his little work, Chemista scepticus, he rejects both the
Aristotelian theory of elements and that of the alchemists, stating
that the progress of science is not delayed if we do not know the abso-
lutely original components of matter, for as long as we can analyse
material bodies into their components, we have what is necessary to
our knowledge. On the positive side of his doctrine, as expressed in
his work, The excellences and grounds of the mechanical philosophy, he pro-
moted the mechanical theory of corpuscles as the basis for the expla-
nation of chemical processes.
Boyle contributes to a clearer concept of “nature” in his Tractatus
de ipsa natura. He distinguishes three meanings of “nature”: (a) as a
creative divine force, (b) as the essence of things, and (c) as the order-
ly and fixed processes or system of the universe. He rejects a perso-
nification of nature as in (a), as well as an Aristotelian substantialisa-
tion of nature as in (b) (cf Clay 1915: 117). Instead he opts for (c):
When sometimes it is said that this or that acts by Nature, it is less
properly said that the thing happens through Nature, than accor-
ding to Nature: wherefore Nature is here not to be considered as a
distinct and separate agent, but rather as a rule (regula), or better as
a system of rules (systema regularum) according to which those agents
or bodies in which they operate are determined by the great cause
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(author) of things to act or be acted upon (Boyle, De ipsa natura 7,
quoted in Clay 1915: 118; my translation from the Latin, JJV)
It should be noted — as Clay does — that an important shift has
taken place in the natural sciences : the quest for the substance or form
of a thing has been replaced by a search for rules, and “nature” has as-
sumed the meaning of a system of rules. Gradually an anti-metaphy-
sical trend was taking hold, to be concluded by Auguste Comte two
centuries later. Recognising the metaphorical character of the term
“law of nature”, Boyle calls it “an improper and figurative expression”
(for we say rather that an arrow is moved by an external impulse than
by a law; cf Mason 1956: 136). But he uses the term “nature” incon-
sistently: it is neither substance nor accident; it is neither gifted with
an intellect nor driven by a blind fate; it is rather the aggregate of cor-
puscles in movement (while elsewhere it is the law itself).7
Thus Boyle uses “nature” to indicate both a system of rules and
the aggregate of bodies which move in conformity with those rules.
But the meaning of “nature” is here limited to the mechanical aspect
of reality. Behind the system of rules or law of nature Boyle presup-
poses an intelligent being, after the analogy of a clockmaker. Thus
the idea of a first cause as the lawmaker is retained. Although the me-
chanistic approach dominates, there remains a theistic presupposi-
tion which may even have been teleological.
5.2 Isaac Newton (1642-1727)
Newton, a younger contemporary of Boyle, was the great systema-
tiser of the seventeenth century, and would become the admired
model of intellectual work in the eighteenth century.  Newton com-
bined the mathematical approach with the heritage of experimental
science in his great work Philosophia naturalis principia mathematica
(1687). He used the laws of movement from Galileo, Descartes and
Huyghens, Patrizzi’s ideas of absolute space and time, Kepler’s laws
7 Nature is an aggregate of bodies which constitute the form of the world,
considered as a principle according to the power of which they act or are acted
upon, in conformity to the laws (legibus) of movement precribed by the author
of Nature (Boyle, De ipsa Natura 21, quoted in Clay 1915: 119; my translation
from the Latin, JJV).
and idea of attraction, and Huyghens’s idea of inertia, and he integra-
ted all this into one quantified system. In this way he stimulated the
growth of the Cartesian ideal in the eighteenth century, in the human
sciences as well, notably in the thought of Turgot.
Newton’s work follows the structure of Euclidean mathematics: de-
finitions precede axioms, which are then used in a deductive form of
physics (cf Clay 1915: 121). Newton’s expression “axioms, or laws of
motion” (axiomata, sive leges motus) indicates that, like Descartes, he
viewed these axioms as laws (as far as natural science is concerned). The
influence of Descartes is visible in the formulation of Newton’s first law:
[Definition 3:] The power of matter has the ability to resist, by
which each body, in as far as it is in itself, perseveres in its condition
of rest or uniform motion in a straight line (Newton 1968: 3).
[First law:] Each body remains in its condition of rest or of uniform
motion in a straight line, unless it is forced by intervening powers
to change its condition (Newton 1968: 19).
Although Newton views the laws as axioms, he explicitly adds
the dimension of the general validity of the laws for individual phe-
nomena known by particular experiences. Thus Newton explains his
laws by referring to concrete examples of things exhibiting these
laws, be it a spinning top or planetary motion. In this regard Newton
follows an explicit rule of method (summarised towards the end of
the Optica) in which the experimental method is conducted after the
analogy of the method of mathematics (reminiscent of Descartes’s
methodological proposals in his Discourse on method): analysis prece-
ding synthesis, and rejecting “hypotheses”.8
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8 “As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult
things by the method of analysis ought ever to precede the method of compo-
sition. This analysis consists in making experiments and observations, and in
drawing general conclusions from them by induction, admitting of no objec-
tions against the conclusions but such as are taken from experiment, or other
certain truths. For hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental philosopy.
And although the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be
no demonstrations of general conclusions, yet it is the best way of arguing
which the nature of things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much
stronger by how much the induction is more general” (Newton 1974: 178; cf
Van der Hoeven 1979: 84; Clay 1915: 124).
Newton’s avoidance of “hypotheses” (cf Van der Hoeven 1979:
83ff) specifically concerns the role of empirical knowledge — against
results based upon experiment, he would only allow objections based
on further experiment, not “hypotheses” deduced from assumptions.
He was therefore prepared to keep experimental results in debate,
but within the strict requirement of empirical objections. Also im-
portant here is a certain tension: that the analytical method, follow-
ing the example of mathematics, is given preference; induction is
measured against this. Newton went further than only imitating ana-
lysis, however. As we have seen above, he structured his works after
the pattern of Euclidean mathematics, and quantified his physics.
Given the stature of Newton, especially in the eighteenth century,
the Cartesian methodological tradition was given some support and
this may have affected the social and human sciences (as can be seen
from the discussion of Petty, Locke, and Hobbes below). Centuries
later the person whose work displaced the Newtonian paradigm, Al-
bert Einstein, would still maintain that the truly creative principle
in physics does not reside in the laboratory, but in mathematics (cf
Einstein 1960: 83; Venter 1999b: 174ff).
Trust in the mathematical method is based on the belief in uni-
versal design. Newton refers to the fact that all animals are symme-
trical left-to-right, and he pays special attention to the wonderful
construction of the eye (cf Newton 1974: 65). In his preface to the
second English edition of the Principia, Roger Cotes, a friend of New-
ton, interprets him in the tradition of Occamist voluntarism, which
implied that “the freedom of God to make whatever world He wish-
ed encouraged a sense of the contingency of nature, for the study of
which empirical rather than a priori methods were appropriate”
(Brooke & Hunter, quoted in Hooykaas 1997: viii). In Cotes’s inter-
pretation the mathematical method is somewhat relativised. Accor-
ding to him, Newton avoids the purely a priori approach of Descartes
since he fears that such arguments inevitably lead to the acceptance
of a natural necessity and of atheism, as do the hypotheses of those
who explain matters by occult qualities. Observation and experiment
remain the starting point — “all sound and true philosophy is
founded on the appearances of things” — as well as the criterion for
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rejection of any scientific proposition, again because it is not a priori
possible to tell what God had to do.9
Cotes’s interpretation allows for freedom and design in divine cre-
ation; God is not bound by the designs, yet sustains the pattern. This
is in accordance with Newton’s own way of looking at nature and the
governance of God, and reminiscent of the Calvinian Deus legibus
solutus est sed non exlex.
Towards the end of the Optica, defending himself against the Car-
tesians’ criticism of his theory of gravity, Newton states that while
some have hypothesised that everything is mechanical and banished
the search for causes to metaphysics, he feels that it is the task of the
philosophy of nature to conclude from the phenomena to the first
cause “which surely is not mechanical” (cf Van der Hoeven 1979: 85;
Clay 1915: 127). Newton is not afraid to include metaphysical con-
clusions in his physics, relating the order of natural things to an
intelligent and omnipresent God.10 Believing that the heavenly bo-
dies remain in their orbits on the basis of the laws of gravitation, he
does not, however, see how they could have found their regular places
in the beginning from these laws. Towards the end of Book III of the
9 “From this fountain it is that those laws which we call the laws of Nature have
flowed, in which there appear many traces indeed of the most wise contrivance,
but not the least shadow of necessity. These, therefore, we must not seek from
uncertain conjectures, but learn them from observations and experiments. He
who is presumptuous enough to think that he can find the true principles of
physics and the laws of natural things by the force alone of his own mind and
the internal light of his reason must either suppose that the world exists by ne-
cessity and by the same necessity follows the laws proposed or, if the order of
Nature was established by the will of God, that he himself, a miserable reptile,
can tell what was fittest to be done. All sound and true philosophy is founded
on the appearances of things; and if these phenomena inevitably draw us,
against our wills, to such principles as most clearly manifest to us the most ex-
cellent counsel and supreme dominion of the All-wise and Almighty Being,
they are not therefore to be laid aside because some men may perhaps dislike
them” (Cotes in Newton 1974: 132-3).
10 “All these things are so well ordained; does it not become clear from the pheno-
mena of nature that there must be an incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipre-
sent Being, who sees into the interior of the infinite space as its field of percep-
tion” (Newton, Optica, quoted in Clay 1915: 127).
Mathematical principles of natural philosophy (III, general scholium) he
discusses the complexity and regularity of the systems of heavenly
bodies, which regularity he feels could not be brought about by
“mere mechanical causes”. Rather this “most beautiful system of the
sun, planets and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and
dominion of an intelligent and powerful being” (Newton 1968: III,
388). He rejects the hypothesis of Descartes that a situation of mate-
rial particles arbitrarily distributed, with the necessary amount of
movement and ordained laws, could by themselves have had the ca-
pacity to bring about the present world (the almost deist evolutio-
nary hypothesis mentioned above). Such blind metaphysical necessity
which is everywhere the same could not have produced the wide va-
riety of phenomena adjusted to different times and places, which
have to be ascribed to the thoughts and will of a necessary Being (cf
Van der Hoeven 1979: 90). Thus Newton correlates creatures in their
variety with various aspects of their creator — God is more than a
simple mechanical lawgiver. The anti-metaphysical tendency which
we have found in Boyle (and which was, in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, completed by Turgot and Comte) did not take root
at once. Newton still clearly took an opposite line.
Newton therefore distinguishes different aspects of the infinite
Being. “God” correlates with servanthood (he is the master who is
served and exercises real authority), but “Eternal” and “Infinite” do
not, since I can say “my God” but not “my Eternal”. But God is also
eternal and infinite, and therefore constitutes duration and space (an
idea reminiscent of the analogia entis theory of Thomas Aquinas) (cf
Newton 1968: III, 389; 391). He uses panentheistic language: all
things are in God and move in Him, but such that He is not affected
by this. We know Him from his wise creations and from the final
causality in things; we honour Him and pray to Him on the basis of
his government, for “a God without government, providence and
final causes is nothing but Fate and Nature” (Newton 1968: III, 391;
cf Van der Hoeven 1979: 90). Newton here resists both the deist idea
that laws automatically govern the cosmos and the notion of a blind
fate. But he also rejects the pantheistic idea that God is the soul of
the world — rather, God governs all things. Van der Hoeven (1979:
91) notes that Newton, who found more laws in nature than anybody
21
Venter/Early modern conceptions of “natural law”
before him, did not give primacy to the metaphor of God as lawgiver.
The laws are an indication of God’s good governance, but that which
transcends the laws is even more so, for it indicates that God uses the
laws as part of His governance. Newton attempted to incorporate a
Christian idea of God, in terms of good governance, providence and
final causes, into his philosophy of nature.
Thus Newton approaches Calvin in his insistence on an involved
God who personally governs, as well as in playing on more aspects of
God than just the lawmaker metaphor. It is clear that the understand-
ing of “natural law”, even primarily applied to sub-human nature, could
have a more determinist form (as in Descartes) and a somewhat more
relativist form, as in Boyle and Newton. The nucleus of this difference
is given by differing views on God and His relationship to the law, and
in coherence with this, by the way in which the law is known.
6. “Natural law” in early capitalist economics
While one shift of the meaning of “natural law” occurred in the na-
tural sciences, another shift was taking place in the area of social or
human sciences (in as far as one can talk of “sciences” at this stage),
especially in economics, relating “natural law” to free choice. This
apparently originated in early capitalist thinking, but also found
some expression in thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. Although the
shift in the human sciences had its roots in the medieval meaning of
“natural law”, it occurred in interaction with the understanding of
knowledge in the Cartesian tradition.
During the Middle Ages, especially in Thomas Aquinas, “natural
law” referred to the law of God for human life as expressed in and
through reason. It served as a check on human behaviour and as a ra-
tionalisation of the hierarchical status quo and it induced individuals
to accept their status in that order. With regard to the economy it ra-
tionalised intervention by the church and the state wherever there
was undue hardship. But in the later sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies “natural law” acquired a new meaning, and became the ratio-
nalisation of a new type of economy: the freedom of the individual to
work for personal advantage was considered natural, and gradually
the advantage of the individual was considered as identical with the
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advantage of the commonwealth. Willey (1961) quotes a rhyme
which expresses the new meaning: “God and Nature fixed the gene-
ral frame, and bade self-love and social be the same”. Isolated econo-
mic man struggling with and dominating nature became the norm,
he says. “Natural law” was given a critical sense in defence of econo-
mic freedom, which became the dominating meaning:
On the whole, however, one may perhaps risk the generalisation that
it was the idea of a controlling Law of Nature which officially domi-
nated the Middle Ages, rather than that of the liberating Rights of
Nature; and that in passing into the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, “Nature” ceases to be mainly a regulating principle, and be-
comes mainly a liberating principle [...] The Law of Nature, which
in the Middle Ages had been a check on unregenerate impulse, had
now been transformed into a sanction for laissez-faire and free com-
petition for the spoils of the world (Willey 1961: 16-7).
This “liberating” aspect of nature as natural rights, the other side of
the coin of natural law, came to full expression in the eighteenth cen-
tury physiocratic economics of Quesnay, a free marketeer par excellence.
But the tendency in Turgot and Comte to give preponderance to the
sub-human neutralised it somewhat.
As early as 1549, in A discourse on the common weal of this realm of
England by an anonymous author (cf Ekelund & Hebert 1983: 39ff),
strong criticism is expressed of the practice of granting monopoly
privileges and controlling the use of land by law. This document
comes from the mercantilist tradition. It tried to sustain a dualistic
position which on the one hand promoted state intervention in the
economy (at the time of the gradual rise of the national state) and on
the other hand defended the free market principle:
[...] writers began to argue that man’s freedom to pursue his own
economic interests would, through the operation of natural law,
promote social welfare (Chalk 1951: 333).
The Discourse explicitly states that “proffitt or advauncement norish-
ethe euerie facultie, which sayinge is so true, that it is allowed by the
common Judgement of all men”. Profit is therefore to be used as a
stimulus for virtue: all men should “be provoked to good deades by
rewardes and price” (quoted in Chalk 1951: 335). The belief is clear-
ly expressed that what is profitable to one is also profitable to another
and therefore to the whole commonwealth. In another document
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written by John Mason in 1550 it is argued that the natural course
of prices cannot be stopped by legislation.11
Importantly, freedom and determinism here enter into a dialec-
tically polarised relationship: the economic choices of individuals are
free, but the course of nature (which may be understood as the aggre-
gate of these choices) is a necessary one, against which the authority
of the state is both powerless and distorting. At the determinist pole
the normative character of economic laws does not come to expres-
sion, and thus questions such as that of economic justice are largely
subsumed under or even consumed by individual interest.
The new meaning of natural law, especially the aspect of natural
rights, penetrated British society. In 1604 the “natural rights and li-
berty of the subjects of England” was used as argument in defence of
the abolition of monopoly privileges by a committee of the House of
Commons, and in 1656 Joseph Lee, a country clergyman, argued that
the advantage of private persons tends to the public good (Chalk
1951: 340).
6.1 Sir William Petty (1623-1687)
Petty, a somewhat older contemporary of Boyle and Newton, systema-
tised the economic speculations of the new tradition into a more or less
coherent doctrine. Petty was influenced by the growing natural sciences,
and therefore attempted to base economics on the method of these scien-
ces: like Newton he followed a quantitative empirical approach, thus
becoming the precursor of Locke, Turgot and the positivists.12
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11 “I have seen so many experiences of such ordinances; and ever the end is dearth,
and lack of the thing that we seek to make good cheap. Nature will have her
course, etiam si furea appellatur; and never shall you drive her to consent that a
penny-worth of new shall be sold for a farthing [...] For who will keep a cow
that may not sell the milk for so much as the merchant and he can agree upon?”
(John Mason, Tudor economic documents II, 88; quoted in Chalk 1951: 337).
12 “The Method I take to do this, is not very usual; for in stead of using only compa-
rative and superlative words, and intellectual arguments, I have taken the course [...]
to express myself in terms of number, weight, or measure; to use only arguments of
sense, and to consider only such causes, as have visible foundations in nature”
(Economic writings of Sir William Petty 1899, I: 244; quoted in Chalk 1951: 342).
Petty was a doctor of medicine with a good background in mathe-
matics, and his philosophical stance is also indicated by the title of
one of his works, Political arithmetick. He had in fact adopted the
strict sense of “natural law“ from the natural sciences, and wanted to
follow the same approach in the social sciences. He considered it vain
to oppose natural law by positive civil law. Natural law became re-
converted from natural science to the social sciences.13
Petty uses strong expressions, for example describing any attempt
to resist nature as equal to stopping the winds and the seas. He wants
money and interest also to be handled on the basis of free market
principles, and in this context explicitly refers to  the laws of nature
in criticising England’s laws:
Perhaps they are against the Laws of Nature, and also impracticable:
For we see that the countries which abound with Money and all other
Commodities, have followed no such Laws ... (Economic writings of Sir
William Petty 1899, II: 445; quoted in Chalk 1951: 344).
On the one hand Petty extended the natural science meaning of “na-
tural law” to include the social disciplines and practice once more; on
the other hand he continued the original (Stoic) field of validity of
“natural law” for human behaviour. In this he approached his older
contemporary, Hobbes (our next focus), and in a sense also John
Locke. Importantly, a certain ambiguity is introduced into the con-
cept of “natural law”. It is a necessary process against which it is not
practical to take any steps, and it also acts as a norm which ought to
be obeyed but can be disobeyed. In this way early capitalist thinking
contains one of the dialectics of the Enlightenment — that between
individual freedom and social determinism. With the progressive his-
toricising of reality this was embedded into the dialectic of nature (in-
dividuality) versus culture (socialisation) (cf Venter 1999a) which,
combined with the assumption of progress, developed eventually into
the kind of narrative of mastery mentioned by Owens.
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13 “We must consider in general, that as wiser physicians tamper not excessively
with their patients, rather observing and complying with the motions of na-
ture, than contradicting it with administrations of their own; so in politicks
and oeconomicks the same must be used” (Economic writings of Sir William Petty
1899, I: 60; quoted in Chalk 1951: 343).
7. “Natural law” and politics — Hobbes and Locke
7.1 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
Hobbes apparently retained the older, human meaning of “nature” and
“natural law”, in which it is associated with “right reason” (found in
the passage from Gerard Malynes quoted above), when he argues that
even in the (hypothetical) state of nature, where humankind would be
driven by mere impulse, self-preservation in this naturally competitive
condition would be an impulse as sure as a stone moves downward, but
such self-preservation is in accordance with right reason. The
competitive nature of humankind, though tamed by civil society, is a
reality which enforces itself: every human being is in a constant battle
for power, honour and wealth; I want more than my neighbour, and
will outdo him/her if I can (cf Venter 1996: 179ff). This is the basis of
the modern narratives of mastery as found in the idea of a society based
on competition (Turgot, Adam Smith, Kant). Critical postmodernists
have to note that the present-day competitive society of pragmatist
postmodernism is a continuation of this master narrative.
Even though the older tradition of “natural law” finds expression
in his definitions, Hobbes is in fact not far removed from his younger
contemporary Petty’s interpretation of “natural law” in terms of the
natural sciences. Hobbes himself still follows a deductivist, mecha-
nistic (Cartesian) approach imitating many of the natural scientists of
his time. He identifies the dictate of right reason that leads to, and
is valid for, civil society as the “law of nature”:
[...] wherefore to seek peace, where there is any hope of obtaining
it, and where there is none, to enquire out for auxiliaries of war, is
the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature (Hobbes 1972:
118; cf Venter 1996: 180).
7.2 John Locke (1632-1704)
Whereas in Hobbes the state of nature is in practice untenable (for it
is a war of all against all), and therefore the dictates of right reason
actually function only in civil society, Locke was much more positive
about the state of nature. He believed that rationality did or does also
function in the state of nature, and that we are under the protection
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of natural law insofar as we can trust in rational behaviour (Locke
1988: Two treatises on government II, ii, 6; cf Harris 1968: 56ff).
Textbooks on the history of philosophy tend to contrast Locke’s
empiricism with the rationalism of Descartes. Locke indeed differed
from Descartes — he rejected innate ideas, and argued that all our
initial (simple) ideas have their origin in experience, which encom-
passes sensation and reflection (cf Locke 1894: An essay concerning hu-
man understanding I, i-iii; II, i-vii). But this was only a difference
about the initial material which reason needs to do its real work in
establishing true knowledge. Once the material is used to form com-
plex ideas or relations, the process of knowing proceeds, as in Des-
cartes, by intuitive linking and deductive inference. Locke states that
our complex ideas (except those of substance) are of the mind’s own
making, synthesised by free choice without regard for any connection
which they may have in nature, and are therefore archetypes in them-
selves which were not designed to (and therefore do not) represent
anything beyond themselves. Thus our reasoning concerning these
has a necessary truth since nothing other than internal conformity is
intended — and then, surprisingly, Locke (1894: IV, iv, 5) adds that
we “cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality”. Locke believed
not only mathematics to be of this kind of certainty, but also moral
knowledge; even natural theology shares in this deductive, rational
certainty.14
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14 “Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself, though he has stamped
no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having
furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not let
himself without witness; since we have perception, and reason, and cannot want
a clear proof of him as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly
complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully pro-
vided us with the means to discover and know him, so far as is necessary to the
end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this
be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its evidence be (if
I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty; yet it requires thought and at-
tention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some
part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant
of this as of other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demon-
stration” (Locke 1894: IV, x, 1).
Locke, therefore, does not differ much from Descartes in his trust
in reason and the content he gave to it. It is not surprising that he
shows a positive attitude towards reason when in the Two treatises of
government he gives a special place to reason in the state of nature,
since he was using the older of idea natural law as “right reason”.
While in Hobbes the brutish state of nature was introduced as the
terrifying alternative to uncritical submission to totalitarian state au-
thority (cf Venter 1996: 177-84), in Locke it functions as the relati-
viser of state authority, based upon submission to divine law. Appa-
rently Locke believed Hobbes to be mistaken in not accepting that
natural law is properly called “law” and therefore not binding on any-
body outside of the civil state — the reason for this mistake being
that Hobbes did not take into account God as the lawgiver (cf Laslett
1988: 80). Behind reason as natural law is God as the lawgiver; no-
where has any person absolute power over another. Locke thus be-
lieves that human beings in the state of nature can through reason
have a positive relationship with natural law (as the law of God). Na-
tural law has to have a rational content, but Locke rejected innate
ideas, and this created a consistency problem for him:
The trouble was that Locke began by basing right and wrong on
God’s commands and punishments, but [...] adopted a hedonistic
ethic as well, an ethic of the Hobbesian sort. Meanwhile he passio-
nately believed in the possibility of demonstrating ethics mathema-
tically, though he was perpetually complicating everything with his
anthropological relativism, noting the variety of ethical values
among the world’s peoples and hinting that virtue and vice were
simply customary (Laslett 1988: 82).
For Locke the existence of God was not only evident, but know-
ledge of Him also pertained to the ends and happiness of humankind.
Understanding our relationship to Him and to one another as creatures
under His law, Locke says, relativises our power over one another, for
we are all equal before our Creator and equally in His service.15
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15 “But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence [...] The
state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that be-
ing all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health,
liberty, or possessions. For men being all the workmanship of one Omnipotent,
and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the
world by his order and about his business, they are his property, whose work-
Natural law is reason, and its contents determine certain duties,
which can be summarised as respect for life, health, liberty and pos-
sessions. This relativises any power one person may have over another
(cf Locke 1988: II, ii 8), for humankind belongs to God, who made us
all equal. Locke defends the stewardship of one human being towards
another: self-preservation goes hand in hand with the preservation of
all humankind. The state of nature is the state of creation, which not
only encompasses liberty but also equality, which in turn implies the
obligation of mutual love (Locke 1988: II, ii, 5).
Political power is also relativised: one cannot deduce it from the
parental authority of Adam, since there is no way to determine who
has inherited Adam’s authority, nor can it be deduced from the right
of the strongest, for that would entail a perpetual challenging of state
authority. Both of these would lead to a totalitarian state in which
the limits of political power were not clearly recognised. Locke clear-
ly distinguishes the power of a magistrate over a subject from that of
a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over
his wife and a lord over his slave (relationships which can all inhere
in one person). He thus limits political power to the right of making
laws (with the death penalty and lesser penalties) with regard to the
regulation and preservation of property, as well as defending the
community against foreign attack, while using the force of the com-
munity itself in the execution of these laws, all of this being limited
to the public good (Locke 1988: II, i, 1-3).16
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manship they are, made to last during his, not another’s pleasure. And being
furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there can-
not be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to
destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior
ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and
not to quit his station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own preservation
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of
mankind, and may not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or
impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health,
limb, or goods of another” (Locke 1988: II, ii, 6).
16 In distinguishing and limiting the different power relationships in which one
person can operate, Locke gives a clearer anticipation of the neo-Calvinist doc-
trine of sphere sovereignty of the different “social” groupings than that found by
Spykman (1976) in Calvin’s own writings.
The meaning of “law” is important in this context. In any state of
“created beings capable of laws”, laws are the conditions of freedom.
In Locke’s own words:
For Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation, as the
direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, and
prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under that
Law. [...] and that ill deserves the Name of Confinement which
hedges us in only from Bogs and Precipices. So that, however it may
be mistaken, the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to pre-
serve and enlarge Freedom (Locke 1988: II, vi, 57).
The law of nature, understood correctly, must then be the condition
of that liberty which is such an essential characteristic of the state of
nature. Under the law of nature (as under the positive law of the state),
one is free to the degree of one’s mature knowledge of the law, so that
one’s actions may be within the bounds of it (Locke 1988: II, vi, 59).
When Locke says that reason (the law of nature) teaches us that
“being all equal and independent”, there cannot be a subordination
of the kind “that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we
were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are
for ours”, he anticipates Kant’s idea of human dignity. Kant states  of
human beings that, being equal to all rational beings, no human be-
ing is to be used merely as an instrument, as can be done with brute
animals (cf Venter 2000: 151-5). In content the law of nature is di-
rectly connected with living a dignified life, for “the fundamental
law of nature, man being to be preserved”, stipulates that if all can-
not be preserved, then at least the innocent, and that any attacker can
be handled in the way of beasts of prey (Locke 1988: II, iii, 16). A
criminal who violates the “right rule of reason” “declares himself to
quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature”
(Locke 1988: II, ii, 10), relinquishing his right to dignified treat-
ment. One has to read “preservation” here in a wide sense, since it
implies resistance against absolute power, for any attempt to acquire
absolute power over a person implies a state of war against him,
which has to be understood “as a declaration of a design upon his
life”, to enslave that person and thus take away his freedom, and to-
gether with freedom all the rest, for freedom is the “foundation of all
the rest” (Locke 1988: II, iii, 17). Locke supports the view of Hooker
that the independent individual does not have the self-sufficiency to
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supply him/herself with the means fit for the dignity of man, and
therefore will naturally seek society with others (Locke 1988: II, ii, 15).
Hobbes viewed the state of nature as a state of war of all against
all. Locke clearly distinguishes the state of nature from the state of
war. Men living together according to reason, without a common su-
perior on earth to judge between them, are living in the state of na-
ture, while any force exerted without right against a person, whether
there is a common judge or not, is a state of war (Locke 1988: II, iii,
19). The execution of the law of nature in the state of nature belongs
to all men, the law of nature being easier to understand than positive
law. Punishment of transgression against one’s person is granted by
both the right of self-preservation and the right of preserving all
mankind (Locke 1988: II, ii, 12-3). Locke knows that this theory
raises the problem that everyone is judge in his own case, and some
at least may be irrational, selfish, or vengeful. He grants that civil
government is the remedy for the disadvantages of the state of nature
— but not just any government. Absolute monarchs are but men,
and therefore monarchical governments are a continuance of the state
of nature. Not just any social contract ends the state of nature; only
one in which there is mutual agreement to enter into a community
and establish a body politic (Locke 1988: II, ii, 13-5).
Property has to be preserved according to the stipulations of na-
tural law, and this is also one of the two central tasks of the political
power (as quoted above). Locke anticipates Marx’s view that one’s
work is part of one’s person, and the products of one’s labour are
therefore one’s own. Thus preservation of the person implies the pre-
servation of property.17
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17 “Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man
has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The
labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. What-
soever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he
hath mixed his labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and there-
by makes it his property. It being removed from the common state nature placed it
in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right
of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no
man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is
enough, and as good left in common for others” (Locke 1988: II, v, 27).
It is the “law of reason” which makes the Indian the owner of the
deer he has killed. Although in the civilised world there are now po-
sitive laws which regulate property, the law of nature for the begin-
ning of property (ie, appropiation on the basis of work, by common
consent) is still operative (Locke 1988: II, v, 29-30). We seem to have
here an individualist, capitalist view of the human “self” as property
which produces further property. Locke thinks that modern man
rightfully accumulates property, for the most useful property is of
short duration and decays by itself, while the most durable things,
such as diamonds and money, are the least useful. Inequality of
wealth is unproblematic since people will always have access to the
resources required for the production of useful goods (Chalk 1951:
346-7). Locke does not seem sensitive to the limitations of resources
or the problem of access to available resources (poverty). In property
relationships, therefore, we have the strongest perseverance of the law
of nature in civil society.
This analysis of Locke’s views on “natural law” reveals on the one
hand an adherence to a form of rationalism in which natural law not
only retains the age-old link with reason, but is even identified with
reason. On the other hand Locke accommodates something of the ca-
pitalist shift by stressing that natural law conditions freedom. This
is the nucleus of his teaching on the dignity and equality of all hu-
man beings. The eighteenth century probably adopted more of the
Hobbesian and the natural sciences’ view of nature and its law — na-
ture as the sub-rational in Rousseau, Quesnay, Turgot, and Kant —
than of Locke. But Locke’s linking of rationality with freedom prefi-
gures the other side of the Enlightenment’s dialectical coin. Locke’s
discourse, however, is not simply a narrative of mastery, for nature
and reason represent a higher law founded in the creation of human-
kind, which precisely forbids mastery of one human being by an-
other. This may have been dialectical, for the law of nature does allow
for mastery of the sub-human in terms of property, and property re-
lations imply power relationships which Locke, trusting in reason,
does not see. The broader context of Hobbes’s political thought may
rather have provided the basis for a narrative of mastery, for he popu-
larised the idea of a permanent competition for power, honour, and
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wealth, which was taken up by thinkers like Turgot, Adam Smith,
and Kant in the eighteenth century.
8. Conclusion
Our picture of the conceptions of natural law in early modern times
presents more variety of opinion than simply a group of narratives of
mastery. “Natural law” or “the laws of nature” is a central idea with
regard to control over “nature”. What Owens calls “the narrative of
mastery” has its origin in Descartes, who proclaimed the lordship of
reason over nature through the innate axioms of reason which he cal-
led “laws of nature”. But such an approach was not characteristic of
the natural scientists, Boyle and Newton. The relationship between
God and natural law is conceived of differently: rather more in the line
of Calvin than of Cartesian rationalism. The capitalist tradition and
those thinkers concerned with human affairs also continued the an-
cient and medieval idea of a rational law of nature for human affairs,
but with the emphasis on human freedom, which in time could de-
velop into the doctrine of autonomous mastery which is later found in
Kant. However, in Locke (as in Cicero) the natural law is still a high-
er law, which at least prohibits simple mastery over human beings. In
early capitalism, natural law provided the argument for market
freedom yet dialectically imposed its own determinations of society.
The conceptions of natural law surveyed give an indication of the
development of the modern ideas of “nature” and the application of
“law” in areas other than the positive law of the state. In the Middle
Ages “nature” referred to that part of creation which was distinguish-
able from the supernatural, and “natural law” was that law which
God gave at the original creation — a law for human life and, impor-
tantly, which human beings could understand, with natural reason as
its instrument, sustained by God. This was still the conception of
“natural law” in Calvin, but Calvin’s strong sense of the role of sin
(and salvation) made him much less optimistic about the ability of
natural reason to understand natural law.
It was Descartes who expanded the use of “natural law” into the
areas presently studied by the so-called “natural sciences”. He did so
on the basis of two fundamental doctrines: (i) the only basis of all true
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knowledge is an a priori deductive one; (ii) all non-mental phenome-
na are extended and follow mechanical principles. Thus he covered
all extended entities under one set of regularities, which could be cal-
led “natural laws” since they were considered as innate (axiomatic)
and rational as the laws for human behaviour. These laws were view-
ed as general and valid for all situations of extended entities (ie, eter-
nally true) and thus presupposed a foundation in the eternal God.
Thus in God’s thinking about creation, these laws were valid for all
possible worlds, and therefore in some sense binding upon God. The
eternal, rational law became an absolute in itself, founded in the im-
mutability of God. In this sense Descartes was not far removed from
the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas.
Mason is correct in attributing to Descartes the expansion of the
meaning of “natural law” to include sub-human “nature”. Surpri-
singly he does not see the reminiscences of a scholastic idea of law in
Descartes, but rather searches for the roots of Descartes’s view in the
metaphor of a despotic ruler — a metaphor that is supposed to be
found in Bodin, preceded by Calvin. The idea of a despotic ruler is
clear in Bodin, but I find it more difficult to sustain a similar inter-
pretation of Calvin, due to his multi-faceted idea of God and of law,
and the relativising of earthly authority in the Calvinist tradition.
Boyle and Newton could follow Descartes in using “natural law”
as applicable to sub-human nature in the fields of astronomy, physics,
and chemistry. It is noteworthy that in Newton an idea of God dif-
ferent from that of Descartes correlates with a different view of “na-
tural law” and a different scientific practice. Newton (and in this he
approached Calvin) had a multi-faceted idea of God and understood
the will of God in a voluntarist sense. Although he structured his
work in accordance with Euclidean principles, he insisted on an ex-
perimental (a posteriori) base for all theory, for he probably did not
believe in eternal laws in the sense that Descartes did — rather that
the government of God is something wider than simply his laws.
The older meaning of “natural law” as the rational guide for hu-
man behaviour was sustained in sixteenth and seventeenth century
capitalism. But a new perspective revealed itself in the use of the
term: whereas it formerly authorised intervention by the church and
the state in human behaviour, it now became the ratio for non-inter-
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vention. The understanding (from the sixteenth century, before Des-
cartes) was now that “nature” (as the balance of prices) follows its
course, and that intervention by the state would be both unsuccessful
and mischievous. Here we already have the dialectic of individual
freedom with the determinism of aggregate choices — the advantage
of the individual cannot but be socially beneficial (a dialectic which
returns in eighteenth-century thought, such as that of Adam Smith
and Immanuel Kant). As “nature” became autonomous, its laws were
eroding the very freedom ascribed to it. This would come to comple-
tion in the thought of Turgot and Comte.
This humanly focused meaning of “natural law” was not totally
divorced from the Cartesian (natural science) tradition, for social
thinkers such as Petty, Hobbes and even Locke all attempted to con-
struct deductive, quasi-mathematical social sciences. “Natural law”
acquired a determinist (necessitarian) sense, probably from its use in
the context of natural science, strengthened by the ideal of a natural
sciences approach in the social sciences. Locke was the exception in
this regard, retaining a normative meaning and allowing for freedom
in the way natural law is positivised, rather than the necessitarian ap-
proach from the natural sciences. In Locke, therefore, the focus on
human behaviour is retained, and a strong sense of freedom as well as
distinct rights are included. It was probably from Locke that Ques-
nay (the leader of the physiocratic school in the eighteenth century)
adopted his insistence on freedom and rights as the essential aspects
of the functioning of natural law, except that he attempted to unify
the natural sciences meaning with the human meaning and thus
opened the way for Turgot and Comte to take a one-sided natural
sciences approach.
It is also to be noted that in most cases the acceptance of a law of
nature implied the existence of a divine lawgiver. The content of the
idea of the lawgiver, especially the way in which his relationship with
the law is conceived, determines the status of the law and the way in
which it is known. Thus the more voluntarist approach of Newton
(that God is personally involved in more ways than only as the law-
giver) allows for a more relativist look at laws, while the eternalising
of the law in God in Descartes absolutises law for all possible worlds.
The separation of law from the lawgiver, on the other hand, when it
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is considered as autonomous nature in action through individual
freedom, dialectically absolutises the law of nature again in a deter-
minist sense. In the nineteenth-century humanism of the mature Au-
guste Comte this led to fully-fledged “legalism”.
A study of “natural law” highlights some of the deeper tensions
in modern humanism. When natural law was generalised into a ne-
cessity which was supposed to liberate humankind from the bonds of
nature, the question came up whether reason — the new “supernatu-
ral” — is part of nature or not, and how it is that nature (which pro-
duces reason) can work towards that which is suppressive of nature.
When natural law becomes the means of putting nature to use and
exploitation (in other words, structuring nature according to the hu-
man image) — what Owens calls “the narratives of mastery” — the
question arises as to how the product of nature can become the
structural lawgiver of nature. These are the kinds of questions one is
faced with when reading thinkers by whom the faith in progress is
more explicitly stated than by those discussed above — thinkers like
Adam Smith, Turgot, Kant, Comte, and Marx.
When postmodernists like Owens critically reject as monolithic
the “narratives of mastery” of modernity, the question arises whether
the role of “natural law” as a higher or divine law which exactly li-
mits human mastery, at least in some early modern thinkers, passed
unnoticed. If such a higher law is rejected, then of course the world
debate on issues such as human rights, for example, becomes proble-
matic too. And furthermore, when postmodern society profiles itself
as a competitive society, one may ask whether a real narrative of mas-
tery, such as that of Hobbes (and also of Turgot, Kant, and social Dar-
winism), has not been continued and developed into an encompas-
sing world narrative, and whether postmodernism is able to comple-
tely dissociate itself from this.
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